Algorithmic Authoritarianism: Inside Orbán’s digital army

For the past 15 years, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has functioned as a bellwether for far-right populism in Europe. Long before ‘democratic backsliding’ became the familiar term it is today, Orbán demonstrated how an elected leader can dismantle independent media and concentrate power, all while continuing to use elections to claim democratic legitimacy. Viktor Mák breaks down this strategy and explains why progressives need to keep a keen eye on these far-right campaigning moves and digital tactics. 

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In recent years, Orbán has abandoned the traditional party membership model in favor of something more flexible and better adapted to today’s information environment: a base of supporters who are not just voters, but active participants in the production and amplification of political messaging. As Orbán told a hall of 1500 of his supporters and volunteers last October: “Once we fought on the fortress walls, today we fight on Facebook.”

In Hungary, and especially in Orbán’s circles, politicians have long blurred the boundaries between the real and the symbolic. But over the past year, the government has begun to translate its familiar warlike metaphors into a fully-fledged digital strategy. Seemingly spooked by the rise of Hungarian opposition figure Péter Magyar – a former insider who turned against the regime last year, and who rose to fame using mostly his Facebook page – the Orbán government is now doubling down on their efforts in the digital sphere.

The Orbán government is now doubling down on their efforts in the digital sphere.

Funding an a far-right ecosystem of influence

Those efforts were already comprehensive. In 2020, the ruling party Fidesz created Megafon Központ, a professional communications hub presented as a civic initiative for ‘patriotic influencers’. The idea was straightforward: train a small group of loyal creators, provide them with studios, editors and advertising budgets, and flood Facebook with content that looks spontaneous but isn’t. 

Megafon has since spent tens of millions of euros, while offering little transparency about its funding – in 2024 alone, Megafon reported roughly 15 million euros as ‘income’, without further specification. Within the Orbán system, projects like this are often funded through government-aligned foundations, blurring the lines between public money and partisan activities.

Fidesz has also spent astronomical amounts on overt political ads, such as €60.000 on a single video before the 2024 EU elections: a 15-second spot built around images of war and instability, which framed the EU as a choice between Orbán’s promise of peace and the desire of opposition figures for war. Within 11 days it reached more viewers than Hungary has inhabitants. 

The logic of virality has changed: the algorithm rewards content that feels personal and unprompted.

But the times are changing. Paid political advertising has effectively disappeared from major platforms in the EU, after new transparency rules led companies like Meta and Google to withdraw political ads. And the architecture of social media is shifting. As Facebook, Instagram and TikTok have begun favoring recommendation algorithms over follower networks, paid reach alone no longer guarantees visibility. The logic of virality has changed: the algorithm rewards content that feels personal and unprompted. 

From followers to digital foot soldiers

So Fidesz has adapted. Last spring, Orbán announced his founding of the ‘Harcosok Klubja’ – ‘Fighter’s Club’ – a nationwide effort to recruit and train supporters as the next generation of what he called ‘digital foot soldiers’. Its first event in Budapest’s BOK Hall was framed as a call to arms, with Orbán emphasizing that the digital sphere has become the new ‘battlefield’ in politics. Behind all of the theatricality hides real organisational logic. The Fighters’ Club now functions as a mobilisation wing for the existing Megafon digital empire. It’s a system designed to convert followers into ‘political message amplifiers’.

The imagery Orbán uses is deliberately martial. He speaks of ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘defending the homeland’, crafting a narrative in which ordinary men and women take on elites, while distributing ranks and giving volunteers detailed roles and missions. He organizes ‘training camps’ that mix motivational spectacle  (according to some independent Hungarian media reminiscent of American megachurches) with constant pushing for ideological loyalty. The prime minister shows up to these events himself, along with other high-profile politicians from his circle. 

Orbán said he expects everyone to work an hour or two everyday on Facebook until the elections.

Participants, such as the 1500 Orbán gathered at Lake Balaton during the weekend of 18 and 19 October, are told to build online profiles, share party narratives, and report back on what works. At one such event, Orbán said he expects everyone to work an hour or two everyday on Facebook between then and the elections, scheduled this spring.

If we don’t build online communities, the far right will

Alongside the Fighters’ Club, Fidesz launched a second initiative: the ‘Digitális Polgári Körök’, or ‘Digital Civic Circles’. While the Fighters’ Club draws on military energy and mobilization, this second project leans more on the language of community. It focuses on providing a social ‘home’ for people online; a permanent home, not one tied to election season. It mostly hosts discussions and events online. Together these clubs form a two-tiered network. This network operates less like a movement than like a collection of regiments: disciplined, hierarchical, and constantly monitored for performance. 

Fidesz feels the need to do all this despite controlling much of the regular media in Hungary.

From the outside, it might all seem rather theatrical: a prime minister calling followers to arms against Brussels on Facebook. But this strategy is informed by a genuine understanding of how information flows now work. And it shows just how important the digital world has become to politics: Fidesz feels the need to do all this despite controlling much of the regular media in Hungary.

While Fidesz’s war-like rhetoric may be extreme, it’s undeniable that there is in fact a fight happening online. We win this fight not by becoming an army ourselves, but by building what the far-right can only imitate: genuine community, trust, imagination and solidarity. 

It’s undeniable that there is in fact a fight happening online

Orbán’s strategy is effective not just because it is disciplined, but because it taps into people’s need for meaning and belonging. Progressives would be wise to take that insight seriously. That means investing in durable, value-aligned digital infrastructure that offers people a social home, beyond election cycles. It means creating spaces in which people feel seen, needed and connected; distributing roles that allow supporters to contribute in direct, meaningful ways: as organizers, storytellers and facilitators – not just as amplifiers of messages. 

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Featured image from CANVA

Blog post licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0